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A.

Introduction
The state contends in this appeal that where the victim gives the

defendant money with the specific understanding that the money will be paid
over to a third party for a specific purpose, the defendant commits theft by
unauthorized control where, instead of accomplishing that specific purpose, he
appropriates the money to himself.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 5-11.) Thus, when

Beaudry gave Johnson money so Johnson could buy four motorcycles on
Beaudry's behalf, the only authorized use of the money was the motorcycle
purchase and Johnson committed grand theft by unauthorized control when he
appropriated the money.

(ld.)

Johnson responds by claiming he owned the

money once it was turned over to him, and he therefore only defaulted on a
contract.

(Respondent's brief pp. 8-22.)

Application of the correct legal

standards, however, shows that where, as here, money is paid over in trust that it
will be used for a specific purpose, the recipient of the money commits theft by
unauthorized control when he appropriates the money for himself. Therefore,
the jury verdict should be affirmed and the district court's order overturning that
verdict was error.

B.

Standard Of Review
"In assessing the sufficiency of evidence, we will uphold a judgment of

conviction entered upon a jury verdict so long as there is substantial evidence
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could
of the

beyond a

"

154 Idaho 412,417,299 P.3d 219, 224 (2013) (internal quotations omitted).
appellate court will not substitute its view "as to the credibility of the witnesses,
the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be
drawn from the evidence." State v. Chacon, 145 Idaho 814, 818, 186 P.3d 670,
674 (Ct. App. 2008).

C.

Beaudry's Payment To Johnson For The Special Object Of Using The
Money To Obtain Motorcycles Created A Bailment Over The Funds
Intended For That Special Purpose
The evidence supports the conclusion that Beaudry's delivery of money to

Johnson was "in trust for the execution of a special object," namely for Johnson
to purchase four motorcycles on Beaudry's behalf, and therefore the delivery of
the funds created a bailment.

See Bridge Tower Dental, P.A. v. Meridian

Computer Center, Inc., 152 Idaho 569, 272 P.3d 541, (2012) (quoting Loomis v.
Imperial Motors, Inc., 88 Idaho 74, 78, 396 P.2d 467, 469 (1964)).

Because

Johnson appropriated the money to his own purposes instead of using it for the
special object for which he had been entrusted the funds, he committed theft by
unauthorized control. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-11.)
Johnson first asserts that his agreement with Beaudry did not require "that
the check be deposited into a trust fund, by which the funds would be deemed to
still be owned by Beaudry Motor Inc." (Respondent's brief, pp. 9-10.) While a
contractual requirement to establish a separate trust fund would certainly have
been evidence of the creation of bailment, Johnson cites no authority, and the
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is unaware

an

is a

a

supra (defining

reference to trust account); Loomis, supra (same). There is certainly nothing in
the theft by unauthorized control statute, I.C. § 18-2403(3), that mentions trust
accounts or limits thefts of cash by unauthorized control to circumstances where
the cash was taken from a trust account. Because there is no element of the
existence of a trust account in the statute, Johnson's argument is without legal
basis. See Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 610, _ , 315 P.3d 798, 809 (2013) (statutes
must be interpreted according to their literal words).
Johnson next argues that if the state is correct about him taking funds
entrusted to him for a special purpose, and therefore creating a bailment, he is
guilty of embezzlement. (Respondent's brief, p. 10.) This may be so. However,
a prosecutor has charging discretion where two criminal statutes cover the same
criminal act, so long as the statutes may be interpreted harmoniously. State v.
Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 381-82, 987 P.2d 290, 293-94 (1999); State v. TrusdaU,
2014 WL 503480 (idaho App., February 10, 2014). The two definitions of theft
(embezzlement and theft by unauthorized control) are certainly harmonious. I.C.

§ 18-2401 (1) ("Conduct denominated theft in this chapter constitutes a single
offense .... "); see also State v. Sticklen, 136 Idaho 264, 269-70, 32 P.3d 158,
163-64 (Ct. App. 2001) (reviewing both theft by unauthorized control and
embezzlement theories of grand theft where defendant stole money from
employer).

That his offense could be characterized as both theft by

3

Johnson next contends he or his company obtained "unconditional
ownership of the funds" because he received a check. (Respondent's brief, pp.
11-13.) This argument fails both factually and legally. Factually the evidence
established that Johnson agreed to accept the money under a contract whereby
he received a commission and was required to use the remaining funds for the
specific purpose of buying four motorcycles for Beaudry. (Appellant's brief, pp.
1-3.) His receipt of the funds (other than his commission) therefore did have a
condition: that they be used to purchase the motorcycles for Beaudry.

The

argument fails legally because Beaudry's act of paying by check instead of cash
did not negate the terms or conditions under which the funds were delivered.
The law cited by Johnson (I.C. §§ 28-3-104(1),28-3-106(1) (cited at Appellant's
brief, p. 12)) meant only that Johnson had the right to cash the check. The state
did not allege that he committed theft by cashing the check (or depositing the
funds from the same into his account). Instead, it was Johnson's appropriation
of

funds after he deposited the check that constituted the theft. Johnson's

argument that the use of a check as the method of payment eliminated all
conditions in the contract and gave him greater claim to the money than if it had
been paid in cash is meritless.
Johnson next argues that someone who steals property after lawfully
acquiring it does not commit theft by unauthorized control, citing State v.
Henninger, 130 Idaho 638, 945 P.2d 864 (Ct. App. 1997), and State v. Culbreth,
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App.

already shown,

cases do

for

Appellant's brief, pp. 9-10.)
Under the common law the crime of larceny required that felonious intent
coincide with a taking, but if felonious intent was formed after obtaining lawful
possession the crime was embezzlement.
P.2d 727 (1972).

State v. Jesser, 95 Idaho 43, 501

Johnson's argument that the Idaho Court of Appeals has

reinstated the old common law larceny standard and applied it to all grand thefts
(including embezzlement offenses) does not withstand scrutiny.

Grand theft,

unlike larceny, is not limited to taking, but also includes exercising unauthorized
control. I.C. § 18-2403(3) ("takes or exercises unauthorized control over"
(emphasis added)). Johnson was charged with exercising unauthorized control.
(R., pp. 30-31.) That Johnson had no felonious intent upon receiving the money

is irrelevant because he was not charged with unlawful taking; the relevant
question was his intent when he exercised unauthorized control over the money.
Johnson's argument that he had to have felonious intent at a time other than
when he committed the criminal act for which he was charged is meritless. See
I.C. § 18-114 (crime requires union of act and intent).

1 Johnson also argues that the state failed to prove exactly where the money
went (Respondent's brief, pp. 16-20), or exactly whom he stole it from
(Respondent's brief, pp. 21-22).
Johnson is apparently asserting these
arguments as alternative bases for affirming the district court, because
Johnson's factual claims regarding what the evidence shows is directly contrary
to those articulated by the district court. (Tr., p. 93, L. 14 - p. 94, L. 18.)
Because these arguments have neither factual merit nor ascertainable legal
relevance the state is not responding to them in this brief.
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is is a

a
restatement of the district court's conclusion that because Johnson

the

money in question pursuant to a legitimate contract, he could not have stolen the
money when he later appropriated it.

(See Tr., p. 269, Ls. 21-25.)

While

certainly not all breaches of contract are thefts, the fact that a defendant's theft
also breached a contract does not insulate him from criminal accountability. The
evidence demonstrated that Johnson received the money in question, except for
a commission, in trust to perform a specific transaction that Beaudry could not
himself perform.

Johnson is no different from an attorney who receives a

payment meant to settle a claim but instead keeps the money; a real estate
agent who receives money to purchase a house but instead keeps the money; or
a boy who receives money to buy a Christmas turkey but instead keeps the
money. All of these would be theft. Johnson had authorized control over the
money only to buy motorcycles for Beaudry. When he appropriated the money
for himself he exercised unauthorized control.
should be reversed.
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The district court erred and

reverse
judgment of acquittal,

the jury verdict, and

for sentencing

proceed ings.
DATED this 13th day of Februa
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